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NO. 51 DECEMBER 2018 Introduction
Intelligence Support for 
EU Security Policy 
Options for Enhancing the Flow of Information and Political Oversight 
Raphael Bossong 
Since 2015, security cooperation between European Union (EU) member states has 
progressed at an accelerated pace. For the Union’s foreign, security, and defence 
policy, there is the prospect that increased cooperation and enhanced arms coopera-
tion will create more international capacity to act. As far as internal security is con-
cerned, the continuing threat of terrorism is spurring the establishment of a “Euro-
pean Security Union” based on an intensive exchange of information between security 
authorities. In the shadow of these developments is the question of the extent to 
which European intelligence cooperation should also be promoted. In this particularly 
sensitive area, no steps towards integration that would attract public attention are 
to be expected. However, existing approaches to intelligence support for EU security 
policy should be deepened and better monitored. 
 
According to the Lisbon Treaty, national 
security is solely the responsibility of the 
member states (Art. 4 (2) TEU [Treaty on 
European Union]). For this reason alone, the 
idea of a common European secret service, 
which has been repeatedly floated since the 
mid-2000s, remains out of the question. It 
is also clear that the EU cannot play a direct 
role in particularly sensitive areas of intel-
ligence work, such as large-scale technical 
reconnaissance, the management of human 
sources, or the execution of covert opera-
tions. However, EU security policy allows 
for indirect access to intelligence. Particu-
larly in the fight against terrorism, the in-
tersections between European Police Office 
(Europol) or EU data systems and informa-
tion from domestic intelligence services 
are growing. Meanwhile, the EU can draw 
on strategic risk and situation analyses for 
its foreign policy action – analyses that 
are synthesised in the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) from reports by vari-
ous national services. These procedures 
should be made more transparent and dis-
cussed more openly to support a gradual 
and proportionate development of intel-
ligence capabilities for the internal and 
external security of the EU in the coming 
years. 
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Confidential analyses for European 
foreign and security policy 
In 2002, the exchange of national intelli-
gence information began in the so-called 
Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) of the EU 
Council Secretariat. Its primary purpose 
was to support EU missions abroad and to 
contribute to a common assessment of 
terrorist threats. The methods established 
informally at the time are still valid today: 
Member states voluntarily transmit finished 
intelligence reports to the EU. A common 
situation analysis and options for European 
action are then derived from the range of 
national contributions. Openly accessible 
information, reports from European dele-
gations, and findings from the EU Satellite 
Centre complement this work of analysts 
seconded to the EU by their national intel-
ligence services. 
In addition, the EU Military Staff, which 
emerged from the Western European Union, 
was able to maintain its access to military 
intelligence. Its internal Intelligence Direc-
torate prepares confidential military situa-
tion analyses, which are especially needed 
to plan and conduct EU missions in high-
risk theatres of operation, such as the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia. 
For the purposes of an integrated European 
foreign policy, cooperation between the 
Intelligence Directorate and the civilian 
SITCEN was formalised in 2007 and has 
since been run as the EU’s Single Intelli-
gence Analysis Capacity (SIAC). In 2011, the 
Joint Situation Centre SITCEN was renamed 
the EU Intelligence Centre (INTCEN) and 
integrated into the then newly established 
EEAS. INTCEN now has around 100 em-
ployees, approximately 60 of whom are 
involved in intelligence analysis. Together 
with the Military Intelligence Directorate, 
the EU-SIAC has around 80–90 intelligence 
liaison officers and analysts. 
The EU-SIAC evaluations are made avail-
able to both EU bodies and decision-makers 
in national capitals. They provide a more 
comprehensive security picture than most 
EU member states could develop on their 
own. However, it can be assumed that 
member states often keep operationally 
relevant or particularly valuable intelli-
gence to themselves. Therefore, the value 
of the EU-SIAC lies, above all, in its strategic 
and longer-term analysis. In the best case, 
however, a joint confidential assessment 
can also be drawn up in acute crises. Exam-
ples would be the occupation of the Crimea 
or the nerve gas attack in Salisbury, UK. 
Such common European intelligence analy-
ses can have a direct impact on the foreign 
and security policy responses of the EU and 
its member states. 
Coalitions of the willing to 
enhance the intelligence supply 
The standards that have hitherto applied to 
intelligence work tend to stand in the way 
of a deepening of this voluntary coopera-
tion. Already at the national level, sensitive 
intelligence is mostly passed on when this 
is absolutely necessary (need to know), not 
when it is available (need to share). How-
ever, the larger changes in Europe’s wider 
security situation mean that the structural 
need for more intelligence exchanges must 
be reassessed. Brexit will exert additional 
pressure for reform, since the expertise 
of British staff in the EU-SIAC will be lost. 
In concrete terms, a coalition of EU mem-
ber states could embark on the path of 
closer cooperation in the field of Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under 
Article 329 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU). Since the 
EU-SIAC is already regarded as a component 
of the CFSP and the EEAS, a deepening of 
these structures would not have to come 
into conflict with national prerogatives in 
the area of national security (Art. 4 (2) TEU). 
The participating member states could com-
mit to a division of labour and direct their 
respective national intelligence services to 
work on jointly agreed thematic and regional 
priorities. Furthermore, they would also 
commit to feeding related intelligence as-
sessments reliably into the EU-SIAC. This 
enhanced cooperation could lead to a Euro-
pean circle of intelligence analysis: The 
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planning and prioritisation of intelligence 
resources (first phase) would be more inten-
sively coordinated at the European level. 
The collection of raw intelligence (second 
phase) and its first processing (third phase) 
would remain at the national level. The 
final secondary evaluations in the EU-SIAC 
and the dissemination of finished intelli-
gence reports to decision-makers (fourth 
phase) could, therefore, be of higher qual-
ity – and, in turn, shape future intelli-
gence priorities in a new iteration of the 
cycle. 
In parallel, political forums could be 
strengthened in order to improve the use 
of intelligence for policy-makers. At the 
working level, this would mean expanding 
the role of the Political and Security Com-
mittee. The idea of a high-level European 
Security Council, as repeatedly proposed 
by Chancellor Angela Merkel, is also under 
discussion. Such a Security Council would 
offer particular advantages when it comes 
to intelligence issues. The services of the 
member states, which are generally assigned 
to different line ministries, could be brought 
together at the level of the Heads of State 
and Government. At the same time, such a 
Security Council could operate with a high 
degree of confidentiality and enhance stra-
tegic decision-making. 
However, at the level of Heads of State 
and Government, as with most CFSP issues 
– including authorisation for enhanced 
cooperation – the principle of unanimity 
applies. If this were to result in political 
blockades with regard to the proposed in-
crease in intelligence cooperation, member 
states would be free to embark on inter-
governmental cooperation independent of 
the EU. This approach would also be in line 
with the provisions of Article 73 TFEU on 
cooperation in the field of national secu-
rity. However, such an approach risks a 
further fragmentation of the European se-
curity architecture. There is already tension 
between Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO), in which 25 member states want 
to participate, and the more recent French 
European Intervention Initiative (EI2), 
which is currently comprised of 10 Euro-
pean states, including the United Kingdom. 
The EI2 is meant to increase the operational 
capabilities of European military forces 
in the neighbourhood. If this ambition ma-
terialises, it will lead to a common interest 
of the EI2 states in high-quality intelligence 
information on potential or actual areas of 
operation. The more exclusive membership 
of the EI2 supports the necessary confiden-
tiality for increased intelligence exchanges, 
while the United Kingdom can throw in its 
leading capacities for technical reconnais-
sance and security relationship with the 
United States. In order to prevent the EI2 
from splitting PESCO and to keep from 
losing sight of the importance of the civil-
ian CFSP, the EU-SIAC should therefore be 
supported by the broadest possible coalition 
of member states within the framework of 
enhanced cooperation under EU law. From 
the perspective of PESCO, joint projects for 
technical reconnaissance and intelligence 
analysis could also be envisaged in the 
medium term.  
Personal data for the purposes 
of combating terrorism and 
enhancing internal security 
As far as internal security is concerned, 
the terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015 
in Paris boosted the level of intelligence 
exchanges in Europe. France sent sensitive 
intelligence leads to Europol, especially to 
obtain cross-checks by using the US Terror-
ist Finance Tracking Program, for which 
Europol has served as the central European 
interface since 2010. Other EU member 
states that had previously been reluctant 
to cooperate with Europol subsequently 
shared their data on so-called foreign fight-
ers. As part of this dynamic, the European 
Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) was set 
up within Europol at the beginning of 2016; 
together with a new version of Europol’s 
legal mandate, this opened up new oppor-
tunities for cooperation. Article 2 of this 
reformed regulation keeps it open as to 
which national “competent authorities” 
responsible for combating and preventing 
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serious crimes can be involved in Europol 
working processes. At least some member 
states have taken steps to further involve 
their national security authorities that exer-
cise both police and intelligence functions. 
Looking at the operational dimension, 
the number of entries on Islamist terrorism 
and foreign combatants in the Europol In-
formation System (EIS) increased signifi-
cantly. In parallel, a closed user group for 
national anti-terrorist authorities was cre-
ated inside the SIENA (Secure Information 
Exchange Network Application) data net-
work between Europol member states. This 
closed group should allow for more con-
fidential communication and can also con-
tribute to an increased exchange of more 
sensitive intelligence. At the initiative of 
Germany, an additional steering group of 
national anti-terrorist authorities was set 
up within the ECTC to improve cross-border 
investigations and information processing. 
Meanwhile, Europol is seeking access to 
particularly useful biometric information 
that American services and armed forces 
collect on suspected terrorist fighters 
around the world. Such data can be cross-
checked in the context of external border 
controls as well as in the so-called EU hot-
spots for registering irregular immigrants 
and asylum-seekers. In the summer of 2018, 
the EU also agreed that all member states 
have to upload alerts for suspected terror-
ists into the common Schengen Informa-
tion System (SIS). The SIS has served as a 
central information network for police and 
border control authorities since the mid-
1990s and has long been supplemented 
informally with inputs from intelligence 
services. In the future, Europol should 
participate in the analysis of Passenger 
Name Records (PNR) data and support the 
management of a pan-European warning 
list. This list is to prevent third-country 
nationals who do not require a visa, but 
who are suspected of committing serious 
crimes, from entering the Schengen zone. 
The “no-fly list” and related border control 
practices of the United States, which serve 
as a model for the EU, are based on a com-
mon data platform between police and 
intelligence authorities. Finally, Europol is 
in the process of negotiating agreements 
on the exchange of personal data with the 
Maghreb states of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, 
and Morocco, as well as with Jordan and 
Israel. All these countries maintain close 
links between intelligence services and 
police structures in the fight against terror-
ism. 
On the part of the European domestic 
intelligence services, cooperation in the 
context of the so-called Counter Terrorism 
Group (CTG) was significantly deepened. 
The CTG comprises all EU member states as 
well as Norway and Switzerland, and was 
established in 2001 as a working group of 
the Bern Club, which has served as an infor-
mal platform for combating international 
terrorism and countering espionage since 
the 1970s. Despite these long-standing intel-
ligence relations, the CTG initially worked 
on a case-by-case basis and engaged in rather 
sporadic consultations with the EU. In 
2016, however, the CTG opened permanent 
headquarters in The Hague. There, liaison 
officers of the participating intelligence ser-
vices can access their respective national 
information systems as well as edit a com-
mon database. This should provide for a 
much more comprehensive picture of ter-
rorist networks in Europe. In addition, 
the permanent liaison officers in the CTG 
should help to carry out cross-border inves-
tigations and surveillance measures as 
seamlessly as possible. 
Strengthening the links between 
police authorities and intelligence 
services 
In view of the parallel growth of Europol 
and the CTG, one can pose the question 
whether there is potential for structural 
mutual cooperation. Since 2001, many 
Western states have established procedures 
for the exchange of intelligence between 
police and intelligence services. In Ger-
many, the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre 
(GTAZ) is an example of this development. 
In the summer of 2018, the governing 
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German Christian Democratic Party (CDU) 
proposed a European data platform com-
parable to the GTAZ for combating terror-
ism, organised crime, and illegal migration. 
Apart from the lack of EU legal compe-
tence, there are numerous practical ob-
stacles to such a proposal for permanent 
intelligence fusion. Europol has not yet 
been able to guarantee the full intelligence 
standard of secrecy in its information sys-
tems, while it is also subject to a strict data 
protection regime. This collides with the 
classic approach to intelligence coopera-
tion, in which the transmitting state retains 
control over shared information (Third-Party 
Rule). Data entries can indeed be marked in 
Europol’s databases in order to restrict their 
further use. However, this technical system 
of handling codes does not replace the 
higher level of confidentiality and interde-
pendence in bilateral intelligence relations. 
Moreover, among the 30 member states 
of the CTG, there are differing views on its 
role and status. For example, the German 
government was initially extremely reluc-
tant to respond to parliamentary questions 
about the group with reference to the core 
national security interests of the state. The 
Dutch supervisory authorities, in contrast, 
dealt with the CTG’s working methods in 
publicly accessible reports. In other Euro-
pean countries, international intelligence 
cooperation is often conducted without an 
explicit legal basis. Meanwhile, the partici-
pating intelligence services argue that 
mutual trust is still being built up and that 
the principle of voluntary and flexible 
cooperation must be maintained. In this 
respect, despite growing support for the 
CTG, it is not yet possible to speak of a 
consolidated institution that could be for-
mally integrated into a European platform 
for intelligence fusion. 
Nevertheless, sporadic contacts with the 
EU level could be intensified, for example 
by placing CTG liaison officers at Europol’s 
ECTC. Members of national security author-
ities with both police and intelligence tasks, 
for example from Sweden or Austria, could 
act as a bridge. In this way, information 
from the CTG platform could be regularly 
fed into the EIS and contribute, for exam-
ple, to the screening of irregular immi-
grants in EU hotspots. On the other hand, 
the same liaison officers could ensure that 
relevant entries from EU databases for 
police cooperation or migration control 
are relayed back to the CTG. 
If such a regular exchange of informa-
tion proves its worth through the increased 
reporting of hits at EU external borders or 
through other measures for the prevention 
of terrorism, a stepwise expansion of mutual 
cooperation can be considered along the 
lines of the German GTAZ. This model im-
plies that police and intelligence services 
can jointly discuss and assess individual 
suspects and cases. Despite intermittent and 
unavoidable intelligence failures in the 
fight against terrorism, such direct consul-
tations are widely considered to be indis-
pensable at the national level. Transposed 
to the European level, this would mean 
that Europol and the CTG would hold joint 
discussions and recommend concrete meas-
ures on persons of interest to national secu-
rity authorities. A refusal to act on such 
recommendations would require an explicit 
justification by national security authori-
ties. Thus, even without a direct EU-com-
petence to coordinate operations in the 
field of national security, such a platform 
and cooperation model would in all likeli-
hood boost cross-border cooperation. 
For other forms of serious crime, the 
foundations for similar data platforms are 
already in place. Since 2016, Europol has 
been operating the European Migrant 
Smuggling Centre (EMSC), which contrib-
utes to confidential risk assessments and 
law enforcement measures. The European 
Cybercrime Centre (EC3) at Europol works 
with both a police and an intelligence agency 
from the United States as well as with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
Secret Service in the context of the so-called 
Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT). 
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Rule of law and 
democratic supervision 
The National Security Agency (NSA) scandal 
made it clear that the international activ-
ities of the intelligence services are often 
beyond the control of national supervisory 
authorities. Since then, controversial politi-
cal debates and the actions of European 
courts have led to the first reforms. In Ger-
many, for example, the legal foundations 
and supervisory bodies of the Federal Intel-
ligence Service have been reorganised. The 
European Court of Justice urged Sweden 
and the United Kingdom to apply more 
restrictive rules to the retention of mass 
communication data for the purposes of 
threat prevention and law enforcement. 
Similarly, in September 2018, the European 
Court of Human Rights called for a more 
precise definition of the powers of British 
intelligence services to collect and analyse 
mass communications data. In principle, 
all European states face major challenges 
in ensuring effective control over their in-
telligence services under the conditions of 
technical progress and globalisation. The 
debate on the rule of law within some EU 
member states underlines the importance 
of preserving fundamental rights in core 
areas of national security. 
The EU does not play a direct role in 
mass surveillance, nor is personal data pro-
cessed in the EU-SIAC. Nevertheless, one 
needs to ask critical questions about the 
supervision and democratic legitimacy of 
this aspect of the EU’s foreign and external 
security policy. Mistaken or wrongful policy 
decisions, which may be made on the basis 
of common intelligence assessments, can 
erode the EU’s legitimacy. Just as at the 
national level, it must remain possible to 
attribute political responsibility in this con-
text. This means, for example, that repre-
sentatives of other democratic institutions, 
such as Members of the European Parlia-
ment, must be given the power to review 
confidential documents in the Council (or 
a future European Security Council). 
In the field of internal security, further 
questions arise about the legality of intel-
ligence cooperation. Any answers must take 
into account the EU Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights, recent EU data protection laws, 
as well as national constitutional traditions, 
such as the German requirement for sepa-
rations between police and intelligence 
services. These legal challenges cannot be 
avoided by flexible forms of cooperation 
with intelligence services. Rather, the 
greatest possible transparency is required 
when using low-level or informal proce-
dures, such as the use of liaison officers. 
Only in this way can problematic develop-
ments be addressed at an early stage instead 
of having them emerge through scandals 
afterwards, as in the case of the NSA leaks. 
According to Article 43 (4) of Europol 
Regulation (EU) 2016/794, the European 
Data Protection Supervisor has, in princi-
ple, access to all data, including classified 
information. This is a cornerstone of the 
constitutional supervision of Europol. Intel-
ligence services should accept this external 
control and, more generally, adopt less 
restrictive interpretations of the so-called 
Third-Party Rule in the context of exchang-
es with European oversight bodies. In addi-
tion, a Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group 
(JSG) on Europol was established in 2017. 
The practical experience with this new body 
of national and European parliamentarians, 
which meets every six months, is still too 
limited to draw meaningful conclusions. 
Due to the mixed nature of the supervisory 
body, however, one possible priority area 
could be to monitor the intelligence inter-
faces at Europol. National parliamentarians 
can assert information rights in the area of 
national security, rights to which European 
representatives are not entitled because 
of the EU’s competence restrictions under 
Article 4 (2) TEU. The JSG on Europol could 
therefore act as a building block for a more 
comprehensive or networked supervision 
of the EU’s indirect interactions with intel-
ligence services. 
The Dutch supervisory authority pub-
lished a first report on the reformed CTG in 
February 2018. The report stressed the need 
to strictly examine the proportionality of 
data processing and underlined that the 
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participating services hold collective re-
sponsibility. However, a follow-up project 
on networking the supervisory authorities 
of five European countries (Belgium, Nor-
way, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzer-
land) showed that national legislation 
makes it largely impossible to discuss mat-
ters of common interest, which are mostly 
highly classified. National supervisory 
authorities have, in any case, hitherto 
rather divergent powers to access intelli-
gence databases, or to acquire information 
about the working methods, techniques, 
and international cooperation of their 
respective national intelligence services.  
Even though the EU will not be given 
the competence for legal harmonisation in 
this area in the foreseeable future, Euro-
pean member states should gradually 
reduce these obstacles and cross-national 
divergences. As a first step, the national 
legal bases for international cooperation 
between intelligence services should be 
clarified and subjected to regular super-
vision. At the same time, the objective 
should be to guarantee a higher level of 
legal protection if it is not a question 
of general reconnaissance abroad but of 
intelligence surveillance of EU citizens. 
In the case of persons suspected of serious 
crimes or terrorism, there are numerous 
other instruments available within the EU 
for police cooperation, information gather-
ing, and the preservation of evidence that 
are linked to criminal proceedings under 
the rule of law. Therefore, consideration 
should not only be given to the continued 
expansion of intelligence-led policing when 
it comes to cooperation between domestic 
intelligence services and police authorities. 
Instead, the other direction should also be 
considered, that is, a return as far as pos-
sible to the more narrowly defined area of 
law enforcement and prosecution. 
Conclusions and outlook 
The role of intelligence services in the fur-
ther development of EU security policy 
must be given greater consideration. This 
particularly sensitive aspect of national 
sovereignty will not be able to be directly 
integrated into the EU institutional struc-
ture in the foreseeable future. Beyond the 
EU, there are numerous multilateral forums 
and traditional relationships between intel-
ligence services. Examples are the European 
partners (SIGINT Seniors Europe) of the 
transatlantic Five Eyes Alliance, NATO’s 
military intelligence, and the Police Work-
ing Group on Terrorism, also decades old, 
for the European fight against terrorism. 
These overlapping as well as functionally 
differentiated networks of European intel-
ligence services, which branch out further 
on a bilateral level, will largely have to be 
preserved due to the equally complex trans-
national threats and risks they are intended 
to counter. 
However, the EU member states should 
not only follow old path-dependencies, but 
also develop their own ideas about what 
kind of intelligence support is needed for 
an effective EU security policy. The im-
pending Brexit and increasingly volatile 
transatlantic relations are increasing the 
pressure for reform. Rather than holding 
fruitless and symbolic debates about a com-
mon intelligence service, member states 
should make the collection of intelligence 
and its transmission to the EU much more 
reliable, while also maintaining the coher-
ence of the EU’s foreign and security policy. 
In the context of voluntary coalitions and 
PESCO, enhanced cooperation in the me-
dium term may also include joint research 
and procurement projects for signals intel-
ligence. 
European intelligence cooperation in the 
fight against terrorism is comparably more 
advanced already. Nevertheless, it remains 
necessary to strengthen the established 
channels in a stepwise manner. Once a sys-
tematic and controlled rule-of-law deploy-
ment of liaison officers between Europol 
and the CTG has proved its worth, one could 
conceive of a more advanced platform for 
police and intelligence services at the EU 
level. 
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In any event, member states should 
promote both the powers and cross-border 
networking of their national supervisory 
authorities. At the very least, the reformed 
CTG and Europol’s evolving interfaces must 
be monitored as closely as possible by ad-
ministrative supervisory or data protection 
authorities as well as parliamentary bodies. 
Traditional standards for intelligence work, 
such as the Third-Party Rule or strict clas-
sification rules, must be reviewed. In the 
long term, a European convergence of super-
visory regimes should be pursued in order 
to create a resilient basis for all forms of 
European and international intelligence 
cooperation. 
Dr Raphael Bossong is an Associate in the EU / Europe Division at SWP. 
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